grub2/0084-Don-t-allow-insmod-when-secure-boot-is-enabled.patch
Javier Martinez Canillas 67f30b6a74 Two more fixes for BLS support
- Use version field to sort BLS entries if id field isn't defined
 - Add version field to BLS fragments generated by 20-grub.install

Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
2018-05-11 10:03:46 -04:00

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From eb8fd62e887e624f5c6e7c2ee8512981e8b5be97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 10:40:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 084/238] Don't allow insmod when secure boot is enabled.
Hi,
Fedora's patch to forbid insmod in UEFI Secure Boot environments is fine
as far as it goes. However, the insmod command is not the only way that
modules can be loaded. In particular, the 'normal' command, which
implements the usual GRUB menu and the fully-featured command prompt,
will implicitly load commands not currently loaded into memory. This
permits trivial Secure Boot violations by writing commands implementing
whatever you want to do and pointing $prefix at the malicious code.
I'm currently test-building this patch (replacing your current
grub-2.00-no-insmod-on-sb.patch), but this should be more correct. It
moves the check into grub_dl_load_file.
---
grub-core/kern/dl.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/efi/efi.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
index e394cd96f8c..621070918d4 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
@@ -32,12 +32,21 @@
#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/cache.h>
#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
/* Platforms where modules are in a readonly area of memory. */
#if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_QEMU)
#define GRUB_MODULES_MACHINE_READONLY
#endif
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EMU
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
+#endif
+
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-align"
@@ -686,6 +695,19 @@ grub_dl_load_file (const char *filename)
void *core = 0;
grub_dl_t mod = 0;
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+ if (grub_efi_secure_boot ())
+ {
+#if 0
+ /* This is an error, but grub2-mkconfig still generates a pile of
+ * insmod commands, so emitting it would be mostly just obnoxious. */
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+ "Secure Boot forbids loading module from %s", filename);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
grub_boot_time ("Loading module %s", filename);
file = grub_file_open (filename);
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
index 684ca93f8f4..2588b481e76 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
@@ -269,6 +269,34 @@ grub_efi_get_variable (const char *var, const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
return NULL;
}
+grub_efi_boolean_t
+grub_efi_secure_boot (void)
+{
+ grub_efi_guid_t efi_var_guid = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+ grub_size_t datasize;
+ char *secure_boot = NULL;
+ char *setup_mode = NULL;
+ grub_efi_boolean_t ret = 0;
+
+ secure_boot = grub_efi_get_variable("SecureBoot", &efi_var_guid, &datasize);
+
+ if (datasize != 1 || !secure_boot)
+ goto out;
+
+ setup_mode = grub_efi_get_variable("SetupMode", &efi_var_guid, &datasize);
+
+ if (datasize != 1 || !setup_mode)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (*secure_boot && !*setup_mode)
+ ret = 1;
+
+ out:
+ grub_free (secure_boot);
+ grub_free (setup_mode);
+ return ret;
+}
+
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-align"
/* Search the mods section from the PE32/PE32+ image. This code uses
diff --git a/include/grub/efi/efi.h b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
index 91e29ce66f1..bb3ab7dfdeb 100644
--- a/include/grub/efi/efi.h
+++ b/include/grub/efi/efi.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_set_variable) (const char *var,
const grub_efi_guid_t *guid,
void *data,
grub_size_t datasize);
+grub_efi_boolean_t EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_secure_boot) (void);
int
EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_compare_device_paths) (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1,
const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp2);
--
2.17.0