diff --git a/0349-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch b/0349-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d20f909 --- /dev/null +++ b/0349-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Solar Designer +Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:39:41 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] grub-set-bootflag: Conservative partial fix for CVE-2024-1048 + +Following up on CVE-2019-14865 and taking a fresh look at +grub2-set-bootflag now (through my work at CIQ on Rocky Linux), I saw some +other ways in which users could still abuse this little program: + +1. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag no longer rewrites the +grubenv file in-place, but writes into a temporary file and renames it +over the original, checking for error returns from each call first. +This prevents the original file truncation vulnerability, but it can +leave the temporary file around if the program is killed before it can +rename or remove the file. There are still many ways to get the program +killed, such as through RLIMIT_FSIZE triggering SIGXFSZ (tested, +reliable) or by careful timing (tricky) of signals sent by process group +leader, pty, pre-scheduled timers, SIGXCPU (probably not an exhaustive +list). Invoking the program multiple times fills up /boot (or if /boot +is not separate, then it can fill up the root filesystem). Since the +files are tiny, the filesystem is likely to run out of free inodes +before it'd run out of blocks, but the effect is similar - can't create +new files after this point (but still can add data to existing files, +such as logs). + +2. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag naively tries to protect +itself from signals by becoming full root. (This does protect it from +signals sent by the user directly to the PID, but e.g. "kill -9 -1" by +the user still works.) A side effect of such "protection" is that it's +possible to invoke more concurrent instances of grub2-set-bootflag than +the user's RLIMIT_NPROC would normally permit (as specified e.g. in +/etc/security/limits.conf, or say in Apache httpd's RLimitNPROC if +grub2-set-bootflag would be abused by a website script), thereby +exhausting system resources (e.g., bypassing RAM usage limit if +RLIMIT_AS was also set). + +3. umask is inherited. Again, due to how the CVE-2019-14865 fix creates +a new file, and due to how mkstemp() works, this affects grubenv's new +file permissions. Luckily, mkstemp() forces them to be no more relaxed +than 0600, but the user ends up being able to set them e.g. to 0. +Luckily, at least in my testing GRUB still works fine even when the file +has such (lack of) permissions. + +This commit deals with the abuses above as follows: + +1. RLIMIT_FSIZE is pre-checked, so this specific way to get the process +killed should no longer work. However, this isn't a complete fix +because there are other ways to get the process killed after it has +created the temporary file. + +The commit also fixes bug 1975892 ("RFE: grub2-set-bootflag should not +write the grubenv when the flag being written is already set") and +similar for "menu_show_once", which further reduces the abuse potential. + +2. RLIMIT_NPROC bypass should be avoided by not becoming full root (aka +dropping the partial "kill protection"). + +3. A safe umask is set. + +This is a partial fix (temporary files can still accumulate, but this is +harder to trigger). + +While at it, this commit also fixes potential 1- or 2-byte over-read of +env[] if its content is malformed - this was not a security issue since the +grubenv file is trusted input, and the fix is just for robustness. + +Signed-off-by: Solar Designer +--- + util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c +index 3b4c25ca2ac6..5bbbef804391 100644 +--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c ++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c +@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + + #include "progname.h" + +@@ -57,12 +59,17 @@ static void usage(FILE *out) + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { + /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */ +- char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1], buf[64], *s; ++ char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s; + /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */ + char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1]; + const char *bootflag; + int i, fd, len, ret; + FILE *f; ++ struct rlimit rlim; ++ ++ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE) ++ return 1; ++ umask(077); + + if (argc != 2) + { +@@ -94,20 +101,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + len = strlen (bootflag); + + /* +- * Really become root. setuid avoids an user killing us, possibly leaking +- * the tmpfile. setgid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user. ++ * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user. + */ +- ret = setuid(0); +- if (ret) ++ if (setegid(0)) + { +- perror ("Error setuid(0) failed"); +- return 1; +- } +- +- ret = setgid(0); +- if (ret) +- { +- perror ("Error setgid(0) failed"); ++ perror ("Error setegid(0) failed"); + return 1; + } + +@@ -136,6 +134,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + + /* 0 terminate env */ + env[GRUBENV_SIZE] = 0; ++ /* not a valid flag value */ ++ env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1] = 0; ++ env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 2] = 0; + + if (strncmp (env, GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE, strlen (GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE))) + { +@@ -171,6 +172,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + + /* The grubenv is not 0 terminated, so memcpy the name + '=' , '1', '\n' */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s=1\n", bootflag); ++ if (!memcmp(s, buf, len + 3)) ++ return 0; /* nothing to do */ + memcpy(s, buf, len + 3); + + diff --git a/0350-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch b/0350-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b47b311 --- /dev/null +++ b/0350-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Solar Designer +Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:56:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] grub-set-bootflag: More complete fix for CVE-2024-1048 + +Switch to per-user fixed temporary filenames along with a weird locking +mechanism, which is explained in source code comments. This is a more +complete fix than the previous commit (temporary files can't accumulate). +Unfortunately, it introduces new risks (by working on a temporary file +shared between the user's invocations), which are _hopefully_ avoided by +the patch's elaborate logic. I actually got it wrong at first, which +suggests that this logic is hard to reason about, and more errors or +omissions are possible. It also relies on the kernel's primitives' exact +semantics to a greater extent (nothing out of the ordinary, though). + +Remaining issues that I think cannot reasonably be fixed without a +redesign (e.g., having per-flag files with nothing else in them) and +without introducing new issues: + +A. A user can still revert a concurrent user's attempt of setting the +other flag - or of making other changes to grubenv by means other than +this program. + +B. One leftover temporary file per user is still possible. + +Signed-off-by: Solar Designer +--- + util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c +index 5bbbef804391..514c4f9091ac 100644 +--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c ++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c +@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -60,15 +61,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { + /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */ + char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s; +- /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */ +- char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1]; ++ /* +1 for 0 termination, +11 for ".%u" in tmp filename */ ++ char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 11 + 1]; + const char *bootflag; + int i, fd, len, ret; + FILE *f; +- struct rlimit rlim; + +- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE) +- return 1; + umask(077); + + if (argc != 2) +@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + */ + if (setegid(0)) + { +- perror ("Error setegid(0) failed"); ++ perror ("setegid(0) failed"); + return 1; + } + +@@ -176,19 +174,82 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + return 0; /* nothing to do */ + memcpy(s, buf, len + 3); + ++ struct rlimit rlim; ++ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE) ++ { ++ fprintf (stderr, "Resource limits undetermined or too low\n"); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Here we work under the premise that we shouldn't write into the target ++ * file directly because we might not be able to have all of our changes ++ * written completely and atomically. That was CVE-2019-14865, known to ++ * have been triggerable via RLIMIT_FSIZE. While we've dealt with that ++ * specific attack via the check above, there may be other possibilities. ++ */ + + /* + * Create a tempfile for writing the new env. Use the canonicalized filename + * for the template so that the tmpfile is in the same dir / on same fs. ++ * ++ * We now use per-user fixed temporary filenames, so that a user cannot cause ++ * multiple files to accumulate. ++ * ++ * We don't use O_EXCL so that a stale temporary file doesn't prevent further ++ * usage of the program by the user. + */ +- snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%sXXXXXX", env_filename); +- fd = mkstemp(tmp_filename); ++ snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%s.%u", env_filename, getuid()); ++ fd = open(tmp_filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600); + if (fd == -1) + { + perror ("Creating tmpfile failed"); + return 1; + } + ++ /* ++ * The lock prevents the same user from reaching further steps ending in ++ * rename() concurrently, in which case the temporary file only partially ++ * written by one invocation could be renamed to the target file by another. ++ * ++ * The lock also guards the slow fsync() from concurrent calls. After the ++ * first time that and the rename() complete, further invocations for the ++ * same flag become no-ops. ++ * ++ * We lock the temporary file rather than the target file because locking the ++ * latter would allow any user having SIGSTOP'ed their process to make all ++ * other users' invocations fail (or lock up if we'd use blocking mode). ++ * ++ * We use non-blocking mode (LOCK_NB) because the lock having been taken by ++ * another process implies that the other process would normally have already ++ * renamed the file to target by the time it releases the lock (and we could ++ * acquire it), so we'd be working directly on the target if we proceeded, ++ * which is undesirable, and we'd kind of fail on the already-done rename. ++ */ ++ if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB)) ++ { ++ perror ("Locking tmpfile failed"); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Deal with the potential that another invocation proceeded all the way to ++ * rename() and process exit while we were between open() and flock(). ++ */ ++ { ++ struct stat st1, st2; ++ if (fstat(fd, &st1) || stat(tmp_filename, &st2)) ++ { ++ perror ("stat of tmpfile failed"); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ if (st1.st_dev != st2.st_dev || st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino) ++ { ++ fprintf (stderr, "Another invocation won race\n"); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ } ++ + f = fdopen (fd, "w"); + if (!f) + { +@@ -213,6 +274,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + return 1; + } + ++ ret = ftruncate (fileno (f), GRUBENV_SIZE); ++ if (ret) ++ { ++ perror ("Error truncating tmpfile"); ++ unlink(tmp_filename); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ + ret = fsync (fileno (f)); + if (ret) + { +@@ -221,15 +290,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + return 1; + } + +- ret = fclose (f); +- if (ret) +- { +- perror ("Error closing tmpfile"); +- unlink(tmp_filename); +- return 1; +- } +- + /* ++ * We must not close the file before rename() as that would remove the lock. ++ * + * And finally rename the tmpfile with the new env over the old env, the + * linux kernel guarantees that this is atomic (from a syscall pov). + */ diff --git a/0351-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch b/0351-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dba46d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/0351-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Solar Designer +Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 22:05:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] grub-set-bootflag: Exit calmly when not running as root + +Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root. This +allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while +supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage. + +Signed-off-by: Solar Designer +--- + util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c +index 514c4f9091ac..31a868aeca8a 100644 +--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c ++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c +@@ -98,6 +98,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + bootflag = bootflags[i]; + len = strlen (bootflag); + ++ /* ++ * Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root. This ++ * allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while ++ * supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage. ++ */ ++ if (geteuid()) ++ { ++ printf ("grub-set-bootflag not running as root, no action taken\n"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + /* + * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user. + */ diff --git a/grub.patches b/grub.patches index caf506f..156df9a 100644 --- a/grub.patches +++ b/grub.patches @@ -346,3 +346,6 @@ Patch0345: 0345-fs-xfs-Add-large-extent-counters-incompat-feature-su.patch Patch0346: 0346-chainloader-remove-device-path-debug-message.patch Patch0347: 0347-normal-Remove-grub_env_set-prefix-in-grub_try_normal.patch Patch0348: 0348-add-flag-to-only-search-root-dev.patch +Patch0349: 0349-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch +Patch0350: 0350-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch +Patch0351: 0351-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch diff --git a/grub2.spec b/grub2.spec index 04c2708..2d8c456 100644 --- a/grub2.spec +++ b/grub2.spec @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Name: grub2 Epoch: 1 Version: 2.06 -Release: 116%{?dist} +Release: 117%{?dist} Summary: Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more License: GPLv3+ URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/grub/ @@ -554,6 +554,11 @@ mv ${EFI_HOME}/grub.cfg.stb ${EFI_HOME}/grub.cfg %endif %changelog +* Wed Feb 7 2024 Nicolas Frayer - 2.06-117 +- grub-set-bootflag: Fix for CVE-2024-1048 +- (CVE-2024-1048) +- Resolves: #2256678 + * Mon Jan 15 2024 Nicolas Frayer - 2.06-116 - grub-core/commands: add flag to only search root dev - Resolves: #2223437