diff --git a/grub-2.00-no-insmod-on-sb.patch b/grub-2.00-no-insmod-on-sb.patch
index 828ce81..1bfd6f8 100644
--- a/grub-2.00-no-insmod-on-sb.patch
+++ b/grub-2.00-no-insmod-on-sb.patch
@@ -1,43 +1,62 @@
-From 7a65d7b558974c89f19afaf0d78b54dc0327f56c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2012 09:53:05 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Don't permit insmod on secure boot
+From 8a2a8d6021d926f00c5f85dab2d66f4ed8be86a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 10:40:49 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Don't allow insmod when secure boot is enabled.
 
+Hi,
+
+Fedora's patch to forbid insmod in UEFI Secure Boot environments is fine
+as far as it goes.  However, the insmod command is not the only way that
+modules can be loaded.  In particular, the 'normal' command, which
+implements the usual GRUB menu and the fully-featured command prompt,
+will implicitly load commands not currently loaded into memory.  This
+permits trivial Secure Boot violations by writing commands implementing
+whatever you want to do and pointing $prefix at the malicious code.
+
+I'm currently test-building this patch (replacing your current
+grub-2.00-no-insmod-on-sb.patch), but this should be more correct.  It
+moves the check into grub_dl_load_file.
 ---
- grub-core/kern/corecmd.c |  9 +++++++++
+ grub-core/kern/dl.c      | 17 +++++++++++++++++
  grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  include/grub/efi/efi.h   |  1 +
- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
+ 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
 
-diff --git a/grub-core/kern/corecmd.c b/grub-core/kern/corecmd.c
-index eec575c..3df9dbd 100644
---- a/grub-core/kern/corecmd.c
-+++ b/grub-core/kern/corecmd.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
- #include <grub/command.h>
- #include <grub/i18n.h>
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+index a498682..2578fce 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@
+ #include <sys/mman.h>
+ #endif
  
 +#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
 +#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
 +#endif
 +
- /* set ENVVAR=VALUE */
- static grub_err_t
- grub_core_cmd_set (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
-@@ -81,6 +85,13 @@ grub_core_cmd_insmod (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
- {
-   grub_dl_t mod;
+ 
+ 
+ #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-align"
+@@ -721,6 +725,19 @@ grub_dl_load_file (const char *filename)
+   void *core = 0;
+   grub_dl_t mod = 0;
  
 +#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
-+  if (grub_efi_secure_boot()) {
-+    //grub_printf("%s\n", N_("Secure Boot forbids insmod"));
-+    return 0;
-+  }
++  if (grub_efi_secure_boot ())
++    {
++#if 0
++      /* This is an error, but grub2-mkconfig still generates a pile of
++       * insmod commands, so emitting it would be mostly just obnoxious. */
++      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
++		  "Secure Boot forbids loading module from %s", filename);
++#endif
++      return 0;
++    }
 +#endif
 +
-   if (argc == 0)
-     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("one argument expected"));
- 
+   file = grub_file_open (filename);
+   if (! file)
+     return 0;
 diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
 index 820968f..ad7aa8d 100644
 --- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
@@ -90,5 +109,5 @@ index 9370fd5..a000c38 100644
  EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_compare_device_paths) (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1,
  					     const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp2);
 -- 
-1.7.11.2
+1.7.12.1
 
diff --git a/grub2.spec b/grub2.spec
index 0be276e..047632a 100644
--- a/grub2.spec
+++ b/grub2.spec
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 Name:           grub2
 Epoch:          1
 Version:        2.00
-Release:        11%{?dist}
+Release:        12%{?dist}
 Summary:        Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
 
 Group:          System Environment/Base
@@ -425,6 +425,9 @@ fi
 %doc grub-%{tarversion}/themes/starfield/COPYING.CC-BY-SA-3.0
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Oct 23 2012 Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> - 2.00-12
+- Don't load modules when grub transitions to "normal" mode on UEFI.
+
 * Mon Oct 22 2012 Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> - 2.00-11
 - Rebuild with newer pesign so we'll get signed with the final signing keys.